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China’s Transformation towards a Global Green System of Innovation 
 
Introduction 
China’s economic strategy has been successful in maintaining high economic growth for over 
three decades and the country has become the world’s second largest economy. However 
China has now also became the global top energy consumer and greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emitter. In early 2010 the Chinese Government joined the non-legally binding Copenhagen 
Accord demonstrating strong political will to be part of combatting climate change and the 
global efforts to prevent further anthropogenic ecological deterioration. China announced to 
the international community its intentions to voluntary reduce its emissions of carbon dioxide 
per unit of GDP (namely, its carbon intensity) by 40 to 45% to 20202 compared with 2005 
levels. The country’s national policies shifted from resource- and energy-intensive economic 
development models towards creating an energy efficient and environmentally friendly 
society. China’s innovation policies and overall innovation capacity have positioned the 
country well to achieve such an ambitious move. Its investment in research and development 
(R&D) has steadily been increasing for decades and at 18% per annum, R&D growth has 
almost doubled the country’s GPD growth rate in the last ten years (Wu forthcoming).  
 
China’s substantial economic progress was accompanied by dynamic developments in the 
area of science and technology. The country’s R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditure 
over GDP) rose from 0.9% in 2000 to 1.8% in 2011 (see Table 1). Although this is still lower 
than in the United States (2.8%) and Japan (3.4%), it is higher than in other fast developing 
economies, such as India (0.8%) and Brazil (1.1%) (National Statistical Bureau and Ministry 
of Science and Technology, 2011).  China’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan and medium- to long-term 
development strategy propose a further increase in China’s R&D intensity to 2.5% by 2020.  
 
The sheer volume of R&D investment at present, estimated at US$ 198.9 billion (Batelle 
2012)
1
, is second only to USA with China recently overtaking Japan. The result of the 
expansion in R&D spending is rapid technological progress which is taking place in the 
country. In 2004 China became the world’s leading exporter of ICT, including mobile 
phones, digital cameras and laptops (OECD 2005). Other examples include the development 
of bullet (high-speed) trains and advancement in clean energy technologies. China has also 
significantly increased its innovation capacity by a steady performance in commercialising 
R&D and developing technological markets. The number of domestic patents granted 
doubled between 2006 and 2010 followed by a further sharp increase in 2011 (see Figure 1). 
The value of the domestic technology market transactions, including commercial transfers, 
development, consultations and services associated with technology, also manifested a 
similar high growth (see Figure 1). 
 
The fast economic development of the country however has produced significant 
environmental deterioration and the current environmental performance index by Yale 
University ranks China 116
th
 out of 132 countries
2
. The more recent commitments to 
reduction in CO2 intensity and a plan for transitioning towards a low-carbon economy (Guo 
et al. 2013) are expected to be achieved through further investments in R&D and the 
development of new technologies. China has started to transform itself and this will also have 
significant implications for the world and the global economy but how do its national efforts 
                                                             
1 Australia’s gross expenditure on R&D are estimated to be US$ 21.8 billion in 2012 (Batelle 2012). 
2
 Environmental Performance Index 2012 (http://epi.yale.edu/epi2012/rankings) 
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fit within the bigger global picture? China’s top-down policies are very different to the free-
market innovation mechanisms endorsed in many other parts of the world. If China has 
started to endorse a greener economy on a national level, is this enough? Does understanding 
innovation in China help shed light as to where the global economy is going, particularly 
given this country’s size, impacts and political uniqueness?  
 
Table 1 R&D Intensity (R&D expenditure as % of GPP) in China, 2000-2011 
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Figure 1.   Invention Patents and Technology Markets 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011), China Statistical Yearbook 2011, and 
the National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Science and Technology (2011) 
 
The remainder of the article analyses the main theoretical concept surrounding innovation 
policy, namely systems of innovation. We first present an overview of the research themes 
related to national systems of innovation and technological systems of innovation from the 
perspective of transformational change towards sustainability. We then articulate the case for 
a global green system of innovation as a way to avoid transformational system failures in a 
time when humanity’s life on earth is existentially threatened by climate change. This is 
followed by an analysis of China’s national system of innovation and its role within a global 
green system of innovation. 
   
 
 
Systems of innovation 
Since the 1970s, innovation has been a very strong area of policy research and advice at 
government and industry level with innovation policy “increasingly being informed from a 
perspective of a national innovation system (NIS)” (Dodgson et al. 2011: 1145) and in recent 
years, this approach is becoming dominant (Weber and Rohracher 2012). The need for 
innovation policy is justified by considerations related to market failure, namely that left 
without support the market will underinvest in research (Arrow 1962), may not be able to 
capture all positive knowledge and technology spill-overs if it does so (Jaffe et al. 2005) and 
valuable emerging opportunities may be lost (Mowery and Ziedonis 1998). Hence, the need 
for national systems of innovations which describe the interplay of institutions and the 
interactive processes that generate and diffuse knowledge (OECD 2005). They create national 
patterns of specialisation and unique characteristics, which tend to persist over prolonged 
periods of time making some countries better than others in the development and use of 
particular technologies. According to Scott-Kemmis (2004), there are significant differences 
between countries in the way they invest in R&D, education, offer support to industry, take 
risk or encourage cooperation. Despite many questions raised about the explanatory power of 
NIS (Shariff 2006) and whether it is possible to draw a line between local, national, global, 
sectoral and technological settings and influences, the concept continues to be extremely 
influential. Numerous analyses of NIS are being carried out on a regular basis in countries, 
such as UK (DIUS 2008) and Australia (DIISR 2011), and specific country profiles are 
produced by the OECD (2005). Dodgson et al. (2011) describe the broad policy approaches 
taken by the various NIS as being oriented towards the free-market (e.g. USA) or based on a 
coordinated logic (e.g. the Scandinavian and emerging Asian economies). They also 
identified an area in between these two approaches, namely a “complex-evolutionary” 
trajectory, and point out that no country can yet be located there.  
 
The main characteristic of the free-market NIS is the encouragement of the entrepreneurial 
capitalist economy which generates a constant stream of radical and incremental innovations 
(Baumol 2002). Within a coordinated NIS, the national government plays a key role in 
facilitating technological competitiveness, social inclusion and equity and takes responsibility 
for the development of the country’s intellectual capital, tangible and intangible investments 
around new technologies, encouraging learning to occur across society and adopts an 
interventionist economic position to achieve long-term goals (Freeman 1992). The complex-
evolutionary NIS recognises the complex nature of innovation which requires strong 
coordination logic but also conditions that encourage the entrepreneurship and risk taking 
characteristic for a strong free-market approach. Hence NIS should allow “dynamics of 
variation, selection and retention” (Nill and Kemp 2009: 669) acknowledging “that there are 
major problems facing any attempts by governments to implement detailed coordination 
strategies… in the face of the uncertain and unpredictable nature of innovation” (Dodgson et 
al 2011: 1148).  
 
Dodgson et al. (2011: 1153) point out that innovation policy should “identify and address key 
factors that limit the ability of actors in the system to respond effectively, using a variety of 
public policy justifications and interventions”. Some of these may be within the conventional 
market failure approach but the most important ones are those which address system failures 
as they relate to the behaviour of the innovation systems, in other words “where the scope for 
innovation is limited by policy and institutional shortcomings” (DIISR 2009: 15). This can 
include, for example, the presence (or the lack) of policy measures that affect the nature, 
   
 
roles, behaviour and interactions between institutions. Against evidence that market failure 
analysis can be simplistic and often misleading, Dodgson et al. (2011) advocate that a move 
towards a complex-evolutionary NIS would require future innovation policy making to focus 
more on systems failure.  
 
Despite its significance, the NIS approach (Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Edquist 1997) 
focuses at the micro-dynamics between firms, e.g. “patterns of collaboration, organisation of 
value chains, behaviour of firms, knowledge flows between actors, collaboration of firms 
with universities, networks of innovators, etc. – and the framing and shaping of these 
interactions by institutions, policies and technologies” (Weber and Rohracher 2012: 1039). 
At a macro-level, indicators of NIS performance measure innovation per se, i.e. the ability to 
generate innovations without necessarily assessing how they transform a country’s economy.  
 
The body of research that examines the role of innovation in transforming society, namely 
technological innovation systems (TIS), including technological waves (Mansfield 1983) and 
technological trajectories (Freeman and Perez 1988), has taken a more historical and long-
term perspective. According to Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991), important features of TIS 
are that their boundaries may or may not coincide with national borders; and they are defined 
in terms of knowledge and competences and not just products and goods. The functions 
technological innovation systems play within society to build momentum for change have 
attracted further interest and they have been described as market-oriented activities (such as 
entrepreneurship and market development) but also knowledge development and diffusion as 
well as broader societal functions, namely guidance for the search, resources mobilisation, 
creation of legitimacy and counteracting resistance to change (Heckkert et al. 2007; Bergek at 
al. 2008). The focus of TIS is on the deeper socio-economic multi-level impacts of 
technology and the role of policy to support and build up momentum for these 
transformations (Weber and Rohracher 2012). From this point of view, Weber and Rohracher 
(2012) describe NIS as a way to counteract structural system failures, covering 
infrastructural, institutional, interaction/network and capabilities failures (Woolthuis et al. 
2005) while TIS are needed to avoid transformational systems failures related to lack of or 
insufficient directionality, demand articulation, policy articulation and reflexivity.  
 
In reality innovation systems can no longer be focused only on the supply side of innovation 
(namely providing a constantly increasing number of new products) and related economic 
priorities while ignoring the need for transformation in society’s production and consumption 
trajectories and not taking responsibility for human and ecological wellbeing. Nowhere have 
the innovation systems failures (market, structural and transformational) been better 
manifested than in the area of environmental protection.  
 
Climate change looms as one of the biggest environmental crises in the history of humanity 
(Gold 2004: 4) with anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions causing global warming 
(IPCC 2007). Already the impacts of climate change are disruptive (Min et al. 2001; Pall et 
al. 2011; Dummer et al. 2011) and the next five years are likely to be the world’s last real 
chance to combat climate change before climate disruption is projected to become 
irreversibly catastrophic (IEA 2011; The Climate Institute 2011). International negotiations to 
date have delivered very limited positive outcomes in arresting environmental deterioration, 
including climate change, resource depletion and increasing pollution. Against this complex 
background and the global nature of environmental pollution no NIS will be powerful enough 
to reverse environmental degradation. However a global TIS that aims to achieve a 
transformational change across the globe has a much higher chance to succeed. The need for 
   
 
a fundamental change in the current technological systems is unprecedented as never before 
has humanity been subjected to impetus that it cannot control (Marinova et al. 2012). 
 
Market failures (information symmetries, spillovers, asymmetries of knowing, externalisation 
of costs, exploitation of public and collaborative goods) are endemic to any market system 
and there will always be risk associated with innovation activities (Dodgson et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, structural system failures (insufficient infrastructure, low return on private 
investment, inadequate regulations and standards, network failures and lack of appropriate 
competences and skills) are also likely to continue to manifest as individual countries explore 
what works against vested interests and locked-in institutional inertia. Such failures have 
characterised all previous technological waves and are similarly affecting the current 
technological transformations within individual countries and global society. However the 
new technological innovations will have to come within a completely different set of 
circumstances that have never played a decisive role in the past (Marinova et al. 2012). They 
put a high prerogative on the avoidance of transformational system failures as: 
(1) The trigger for transformation is no longer anthropocentric (namely, improving 
the quality of human life), but is related to sustainability (namely, improving and 
maintaining the health of the planet and all its species); 
(2) In the past innovation was shaped predominantly by market forces and the 
competitive aspirations to reap the maximum benefits from new products, 
processes, services, organisational and marketing ideas (OECD 2005); nowadays 
climate change (and associated phenomena, such as increases in temperature, 
extreme weather events, variations in precipitation, sea level rise, melting of the 
sea ice coverage, release of methane stored in permafrost among others) emerges 
as the new constraint and defining feature of innovation in order to protect the 
living conditions on the planet; 
(3) Until now there was not apparent immediate urgency for the introduction of new 
technologies while the imperatives of climate change and the short window of 
opportunity it leaves humanity to come up with drastic changes lead to 
unprecedented urgency for technological transformation; 
(4) The impacts of the these innovations need to be perceived and assessed within a 
global framework, rather than the discrete disjointed and fragmentary approaches 
used before; 
(5) There is need for a global knowledge system that supports new technologies based 
around integrated (rather than distributed as in the past) systems of information, 
management, policy coordination, demand articulation and reflexivity. 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2. Innovation 
Source: Marinova et al. 2012 
 
Innovation has long been understood as the commercialisation or implementation of new 
technology (e.g. Rogers 1962; Rothwell and Zegveld 1981; von Hippel 1988).  However, this 
has changed in more recent times with technology users playing a much more prominent role. 
Tuomi (2002), for example argues that with the advent of the Internet and social media, 
innovation has shifted towards creating meaning within existing social practices. Impact 
analysis and assessment have also emerged as a strong area aiming to understand the 
potential societal (TAMI 2004), social (Becker and Vanclay 2003) and environmental 
consequences (Holder 2005) of the adoption of particular new technologies. Hence users and 
communities where new technologies are adopted are gradually becoming an important, and 
in many cases, the determining factor in the innovation process shaping it according to their 
desires, aims and purposes. This means that innovation is no longer just about competition, it 
is about doing things differently and transforming social practices with particular goals in 
sight. Figure 2 describes graphically this new understanding of innovation. At its core is the 
new technical idea which can be a new product, new process, organisational change or new 
way of marketing. However, for innovation to occur, it needs to satisfy three further types of 
considerations: (1) existing demand as represented by potential commercialisation and 
implementation; (2) favourable impact assessments; and (3) achievement of particular 
broader aims. For example, in the case of the current climate change challenges new 
technology plays a crucial role in breaking up the dependence on fossil fuels (broader aim) by 
developing more environmentally sustainable products and ways of production, including 
food production, and living (new products), in response to a growing evidence of social 
demands, concerns and consumer preferences (commercialisation and implementation) 
supported by strong scientific evidence about human-induced ecological deterioration and 
need to reduce the human ecological footprint (impacts).  
 
The Natural Edge Project (Hargroves and Smith 2005) describes this wave of new 
technologies as one determined by sustainable technologies, such as renewable energy, 
biomimicry, green chemistry and green nanotechnology. According to Nisbet (2011), there is 
a strong need to merge the innovation network (motivated by energy insecurity) and the green 
network (motivated by climate change) for which he coined the new term grinn. Altenberg 
and Pegels (2012: 5) describe the new technological paradigm as Sustainability-oriented 
   
 
Innovation System (SoIS) which puts “high demands on governance, because governments 
need to disrupt unsustainable technological pathways and encourage alternative technologies 
long before they reach the stage of commercial viability”. All this puts a lot of emphasis on 
governments and policy makers in order to avoid transformational system failures (lack of 
shared vision, understanding of user demands, concerns and aims, policy coordination at the 
local, national, regional and global level, ability to monitor, reflexivity and adaptation within 
a framework of uncertainty) associated with the new technologies. 
 
The transition to green technologies requires a massive effort (Geels et al. 2008). Although 
many countries, such as the European Union, South Korea, China and Australia, are 
gradually taking measures to reduce GHG emissions and promote green investment, these are 
still uncoordinated efforts in a globalised world economy that has been responsible for 
globalised detrimental ecological problems. The only way to avoid globalised 
transformational system failures is through the emergence of a Global Green System of 
Innovation (GGSI), namely a synergy between a sustainability-based technological 
innovation system and sustainability-oriented national innovation systems. Within such a 
GGSI, each country will have a distinctive role and there are already many signs that China is 
emerging as a very influential global player. 
 
Global green system of innovation 
Irrespective as to where it is developed, the novelty criterion for innovation can be applied at 
the level of the firm (minimum requirement), a particular market, new to the world, or radical 
(disruptive) to prior knowledge and practices (OECD 2005). A major defining feature of the 
GGSI is that it requires disruptive innovation that breaks away from tradition, inertia and 
existing vested interests and moves away from established technological trajectories. 
Altenburg and Pegels (2012: 6) emphasise that the management of the green transformation 
will be confronted with particularly serious market failures, including the market failure of 
non-appropriability: “as the social benefits of science, technology and innovation tend to 
exceed privately appropriable benefits, the services concerned are frequently undersupplied”. 
Another concern is the time required for the new technologies to become commercially 
competitive, particularly within markets fraught with coordination and information failures. 
Geels et al. (2008) stress that the socio-technical transition towards green technologies 
involves multiple actors and social groups (not only firms or consumers/markets) who offer 
multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary insights, not just the input from science and 
engineering but also from economics, management studies, sociology, science and 
technology studies, political science and cultural studies. A GGSI is about disrupting the 
basis of society and economic activities, as we know them and directing them on a more 
sustainable path which brings hope for all living species and the planet itself. Some refer to 
this as an innovation journey (van de Ven et al. 1999); however it is a journey that all of the 
humanity has to take simultaneously and which it cannot afford to fail. 
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the building blocks of a Global Green System of 
Innovation. The central block represents the desired global innovation outcome, namely a 
clustering of green innovations as a result of green values dominating within society. In order 
to achieve this outcome, there are four required blocks: people who have green skills and 
talent to come up with the new ideas; entrepreneurial innovative business and access to 
capital to facilitate the implementation of their green ideas; easy information flows and 
exchange around green ideas; and further R&D and appropriate education that stimulate 
green innovations. The change towards green innovation is occurring within a global 
economy that will have to provide the supporting frameworks which include: proper 
   
 
infrastructure and networks for what are likely to be highly diverse and distributed (rather 
than centralised) technological solutions; community visioning and long-term perspectives 
(in contrast to the short-term politically driven imperatives); adaptive governance and global 
institutional alignment that stimulate and facilitate green innovation; and integration of 
sustainability within all processes of globalisation (in other words, mainstreaming 
sustainability.) 
Using the classification of the transformational system failures provided by Weber and 
Rohracher (2012), we describe how GGSI (see Figure 3) can assist in building momentum for 
green innovations through coordinated global activities: 
(1) Demand articulation – refers to availability of space and mechanisms for 
understanding user needs and signals from the broader public. There is ample 
evidence about green consumerism, green values and green skills but all of these 
are currently at the periphery of mainstream economic activities. The main 
outcome, the top of the innovation pyramid should be a clustering of green 
innovations in order to respond to green values within society. Each individual 
NIS should be aiming to deliver green innovations while GGSI will set the 
standard of not encouraging innovation just for the sake of it, but to achieve 
shared green values. Failing to do so, humanity will continue to go down the 
precipice of environmental deterioration be it at an economically efficient and 
effective way. The main function of a GGSI is to assist in articulating the global 




   
 
 
Figure 3. Building blocks of a Global Green System of Innovation 
Source: Marinova et al. 2012 
 
(2) Directionality – refers to a shared vision regarding the sustainability goal and 
direction of the social transformation. The GGSI will need to deliver systematic 
changes that shape society through investing in sustainability-related education 
and R&D which should be able to stay abreast with the urgency and complexity 
of the required changes and understanding of the global phenomena. Open source 
availability of data and research outcomes should be the norm and a sustainability 
lens should be part of education and training at all levels. The global pool of 
sustainability skills and talent should be in a position to generate a new global 
green economy where many of the current jobs will be replaced with exciting 
new opportunities which will be geared by community visioning and long-term 
perspectives instead of short-term interests dictated by global industry and global 
politics. This will require the setting up of proper international standards and 
regulations in order to assist a directional shift to sustainability. 
(3) Policy coordination – refers to horizontal (research technology and innovation 
policies on the one hand and sectoral/industry policy on the other), vertical 
(decision making versus implementation), temporal (timing of interventions) and 
any other aspects of coordination of the concerted efforts for a social 
transformation. Encouraging innovative businesses and access to capital is an 
important function of the GGSI, as is the coordination assistance for the provision 
   
 
of appropriate national infrastructure and networks supported through individual 
NIS. This function needs to be performed based on evolutionary adaptive 
governance which allows for proper alignment of powerful global institutions, 
such as the UN or the World Bank. 
(4) Reflexivity – refers to the propensity of the GGSI to be able to monitor, anticipate 
and involve individual countries in processes of self-governance while keeping 
the channels of communication open. Information flows and innovation exchange 
are critical for monitoring progress as it relates to the healing of the natural and 
social environment. The global sustainability integration block is essential in not 
allowing humanity to be locked into a small limited number of possible 
technological solutions and choices and offer adaptive policy portfolios and 
options. 
There are signs that such a GGSI has started to emerge with the OECD countries signing the 
Declaration on Green Growth in 2009 and the UNEP’s Report on the Global Green New Deal 
(UNEP 2009) following the global financial crises. In 2011, the OECD officially released its 
Green Growth Strategy, which is about “fostering economic growth and development while 
ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on 
which our well-being relies. It is also about fostering investment and innovation which will 
underpin sustained growth and give rise to new economic opportunities” (OECD 2011: 4). 
The Strategy also includes specific recommendations, tools and indicators for measuring the 
progress. In a similar vein the 2012 OECD Economic Outlook stresses the need for green 
growth and policies with a longer time horizon that find ways to ensure environmental and 
social sustainability (OECD 2012).  
 
Business attitudes are also changing. According to a survey of 1,000 senior business 
executives from 12 countries (GE Global Innovation Barometer 2011), innovation will help 
“green” the world: 90% believe innovation to be the main lever for greener national 
economies  and 85% are confident that innovation will improve environmental quality. There 
is also strong research evidence that green innovation contributes to competitive advantage 
(Chen et al. 2006). Green innovation is also becoming a significant area of research 
(Schiederig et al. 2011) with 88% of the publications clustering in the areas of business, 
humanities and social sciences. 
 
More work however is needed in order to avoid transformational system failures. The 
globalisation of the world economy has also changed innovation which has now become 
faster, multidisciplinary, collaborative, democratised and also globalised. A determining 
factor to achieve a GGSI that can shift the globe away from its current existentially 
threatening trajectory is for the global community to adopt a vision for a sustainable world 
that will translate into changes in values and everyday practices as well as in a surge of 
human inventiveness activities. The worldwide economy, together with science and 
technology, needs to reform itself into a new society where national innovation systems are 
geared towards supporting a global green system of innovation. 
 
China’s innovation system  
In the last ten years China has developed a very ambitious national innovation system 
targeted to become a world leader. Since 2000, China is ranked second in terms of total 
   
 
number of researchers which in 2009 exceeded 1.15 million
3
. The majority of them, namely 
61.5%, are employed in business enterprises (with the government and higher education 
sectors accounting for further 19% and 19.5% respectively)
4
. This significantly facilitates 
innovation and the commercialisation of new inventions. Through encouraging university 
education from undergraduate to postdoctoral studies, China has developed strong human 
resources capacity for science and technology. 
 
Domestic and foreign investment in new technologies and manufacturing capabilities in 
China have dramatically transformed its economy. Many innovative Chinese firms also 
“developed a global brand and expanded their operations abroad, in some cases with a view 
to tapping into foreign pools of knowledge through mergers and acquisitions and the 
establishment of overseas R&D” (OECD 2008: 17). Sun et al. (2012) identify knowledge 
spillovers and technology diffusion as a key pattern of high-tech industry special transferring 
in China. Research output in terms of scientific publications and patents has also grown at an 
unprecedented rate (OECD 2008). Despite regional disparities between Chinese provinces 
and cities, the country has many major “innovative islands”, incubators, science and 
technology parks (OECD 2008) as well as industry parks dedicated to clean energy (Mastny 
2010). Located mainly in the eastern half of the country, they have proven capable of 
generating spillovers and innovative clusters.  
 
China’s international presence is felt strongly in the area of innovation. The State Intellectual 
Property Office of China in 2011 received a quarter of the world’s patent applications
5
 and 
Chinese inventors are increasingly being represented in the US Patent and Trademark 
Office
6
. Research cooperation with other countries is also strongly encouraged. For example, 
China is Australia’s 3
rd
 most important research partner and 6
th
 highest partner in publications 
(DIISR 2011). Zhou et al. (2012) observe that China is becoming selective in establishing 
technological standard alliances as they play an important role in enhancing the partners’ 
independent innovation capacity. 
 
As the world’s second largest economy, China is expected to become a world technology 
leader and the World Bank (2012) predicts that China will develop into a modern and 
creative high-income society within decades. By that time Wu (2012) projects China’s 
economic power, fuelled by its R&D sector, to also overtake the United States in becoming 
the world’s largest economy. 
 
For any outside observer, this phenomenal growth is stunning; however Chinese innovation 
policy documents emphasise the need “for a shift in the growth trajectory with stronger 
emphasis on ‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’” (Gu and Lundvall 
2006: 1). According to Gu and Lundvall (2006), production capital and intellectual capital are 
easy to be reproduced, while a key element of China’s development and innovation policies 
should be avoiding the degradation of the natural environment and stimulation the formation 
of social capital. In other words, China’s national innovation system is now charged with 
facilitating a major social transformation. 
                                                             
3 http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=198&IF_Language=eng 
4 For Australia the respective shares for business enterprises, government, higher education and private non-
profit organisations were 30%, 9%, 58% and 3%. This share is about 30%. 
5 http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/iprspecial/201211/t20121114_770467.html 
6
 The share of US patents by Chinese inventors reached 3% in 2010, a ten-fold increased from the humble 0.3% 
in 2000 (according to data extracted from http://patft.uspto.gov/). 
   
 
 
Over the past decade, and particularly during 2006–2010, the period covered by the 11
th
 Five-
Year Plan, China prioritised green development and the creation of green jobs in the 
country’s leading economic sectors (Pan et al. 2011). The 12
th
 Five-Year Plan sets a new 
green GDP growth target of 7% and outlines National Strategic Emerging Industries, 
including 7 strategic innovation driven new energy industries and 20 projects focused on 
innovation, energy saving and environment protection technology China State Council 
(2012). Measures of energy saving and emission reduction have been undertaken to promote 
green manufacturing (Li et al. 2010), including the employment of innovative technology, 
optimisation of the production process and use of energy efficient equipment (Cao et al., 
2011). China has become the world’s largest investor in renewable energy and in 2010, 50% 
of all solar panels and wind turbines worldwide were manufactured there (Pew, 2011). In 
addition, as the world’s largest solar photovoltaic manufacturer, China’s solar PV 
manufacturing capacity doubled between 2009 and 2010, is very much export oriented (see 
Figure 4) and now provides 53% of the global capacity (Varnas et al. 2012). These 
phenomenal changes are regarded by some as a science and technology revolution (Zhang 
and Zheng 2009). From compact fluorescent light bulbs and solar water heaters to PV cells 





Figure 4. Chinese solar PV domestic installations and export 
Source of data: Liu and Goldstein (2012)  
 
The considerable achievements in the R&D sector in terms of investment, capacity building 
and outcomes combined with its large size are positioning the country extremely well within 
a global green system of innovation. China’s NIS is easily characterised as based on 
coordinated logic and away from the free-market economy (Dodgson et al. 2011). With a 
sound government backing, this has managed to avoid market failures associated with 
innovation asymmetries and knowledge spillovers but has failed in avoiding the 
externalisations of costs, as demonstrated in the heavy pollution and other environmental 
problems it has created, as well as in preserving the commons, including the global 
commons. The NIS is now in a process of complex-evolutionary transformation aimed at 
avoiding structural system failures by developing sound physical and knowledge 
   
 
infrastructures, putting in place environmental regulations and developing favourable 
conditions for the implementation of clean technologies, developing green capabilities and 
supporting networks and interactions across organisations. This is a major move that supports 
a sustainability orientation of technology development. 
There are numerous examples of green technology outcomes facilitated by China’s NIS. 
Established in 2000, the Qingdao Kindman Green Tech Group is now conducting R&D 
activities through a network of government and academic research institutes located in 
Beijing, Suzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin in China and also with the United States and Germany 
(Kindman Green Tech 2012). Through these collaborations, its relatively small R&D team of 
around 20 people has been able to deliver numerous green innovations related to 
environmental technologies, new materials, such as reflective films, green outdoor products 
and green household appliances, such as solar cookers and solar cups. The company operates 
worldwide and its annual sales are more than US$100 million (TradeKey 2012). Another 
example is the Peako Biomass Energy Group comprising four companies operating in Hong 
Kong, Jiangxi and Guangdong. The Jiangxi company has a R&D centre, fabrication 
workshop and training facilities to test prototypes and develop patented innovations in using 
agricultural waste and residues, such as rice husk, saw dust, wood chips, nut shells and forest 
wastes for fuel and energy generation (Jiangxi Peako 2012; Jiangxi Peako Biomass Energy 
2012). Further examples of green jobs generated in high-tech sectors are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Generated average annual green jobs 
 2006-2010 2011-2020 
Solar photovoltaics (PV) 
– direct jobs 







Wind power  





High Speed Rail 
– direct jobs 






Hybrid and electric vehicles 
– direct jobs 
  
1,200,000 
Source: Pan et al. (2011) 
Table 3 compares several defining elements of NIS and GGSI and positions them within the 
Chinese context. While NIS encourages a steady supply of innovations (in some cases there 
may be a deliberate effort in picking winners), a GGSI is only concerned with technologies 
that can reduce the ecological footprint and transform the economy away from dependence 
on fossil fuels, GHG and waste generation as well as heavy use of natural resources. China’s 
NIS encourages the positioning of the country as a leader in many green technologies, such as 
solar and wind energy. According to Liu and Goldstein (2012), “as the decade of the 2000s 
progressed, environmental goals played an increasing role alongside export promotion in 
motivating and shaping” Chinese policies in relation to renewable energy technologies. 
What is particularly interesting is that the country is simultaneously inward and outward 
looking. Its current 12
th
 Five-Year plan aims to achieve a more balanced and integrated 
   
 
harmonious society that allows for millions of people to be lifted out of poverty but also for 
resources to be used in a better way. The government strongly encourages international 
collaboration and the building of international networks and linkages in the area of education, 
research and business opportunities. Some warn that the challenge for China is to ensure that 
the quality of its R&D is not compromised due to the expansion of market activities (Wu 
forthcoming). However, fast commercialisation as the strength of its NIS perfectly fits the 
GGSI requirements. 
Renewable energy and energy efficiency in China are attracting not only a lot of research and 
policy attention as a strong example of technological transformation under the imperatives of 
climate change (e.g. Mastny 2010; Pew 2011; Pan et al. 2011; Liu and Goldstein 2012) but 
are also becoming an area of investment and risk sharing supported by global financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank Group (IFC 2012). China’s NIS is an example of a 
government-led effort to align the interests of society, including future generations, with 
those of industry and international community to achieve a transformative system change. 
Table 3 Comparison between National Innovation System (NIS) and Global Green System of 
Innovation (GGSI) 
 NIS GGSI China’s NIS 
Types of innovations Encourages steady 





leading position in 
many green 
innovations, such as 
PVs, wind energy 
and high-speed trains 
Aim Aims at providing a 
competitive edge 
Aims to transform 
the world economy 
Aims at achieving a 
more harmonious 
society 
Values Facilitates skill 
development and 
entrepreneurship 





Strives for improving 
people’s quality of 
life 
Focus Human-centred Planet-centred Government-lead 
Timeframe It is essential to 
achieve and maintain 
high performance  
It is essential to 
achieve urgent 
change in direction 
of performance  
Specific clear goals 






















seeks and encourages 
global collaboration 
















In its essence, China’s NIS is very much attuned with a GGSI. The country is inevitably and 
increasingly becoming not only an integrated but substantial part of the global system of 
knowledge creation, diffusion and use (OECD 2008). Its policy shifts towards sustainability 
are facilitating a decarbonising and environmentally friendly economy. Hence, China’s NIS 
is already supporting sustainability oriented innovations and is ready to transition towards a 
global green system of innovation (GGSI). However as GGSI is only in its infancy, there are 
only a few examples as this can work. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is 
therefore used to analyse China’s transformation towards a GGSI.  
The country’s political and economic stability has attracted the lion’s share and growing 
numbers of CDM projects (see Figure 5a and 5b)
7
, namely 51.3% of the projects (UNFCCC 
2012a) and 64.5% of the certified emission reductions of the total host parties (UNFCCC 
2012b) as of November 2012. As an innovative mechanism, CDM plays an important role 
connecting developed and developing countries through technology diffusion to reduce GHG 
emissions (van Putten 2009). Jia et al. (2012) show that implemented CDM projects help 
China reduce its emission intensities of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide and industrial dust. 
Thus CDM is an important factor for mitigating and adapting to climate change as well as in 
stimulating scientific and technological progress (Ye and Jian 2011).  
50.28%
19.36%









China India Brazil Mexico Vietnam Malaysia Others
 
Figure 5a. Registered CDM projects by host country 
Source of data: http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=6022 
                                                             
7
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Figure 5b. Registered CERs by host country 
Source of data: http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=6022 
 
What is of interest from a GGSI perspective however is how the clean development 
mechanism assists in avoiding transformational system failures. 
(1) Demand articulation – CDM has been a very powerful way to articulate the 
global demand for clean technologies that allow developing countries to reduce 
their fossil fuel dependency and has resulted in clustering of green technologies 
stimulating further spillovers and diffusion through China’s significant 
investment in renewable energy, including photovoltaic and wind energy. The 
global cooperation was based on shared understanding of what are the values 
between any new technologies; 
(2) Directionality – education and technology, both within China and in the 
developed countries which provide the technologies, have played an essential role 
in allowing the successful operation of CDM. In comparison with other emerging 
economies China was better placed to avoid any failure and to keep abreast with 
the urgency and complexity of the projects. The long-term visioning and 
positioning of the country in this market was part of the political decision making 
despite any uncertainties associated with the post-Kyoto future of the mechanism. 
The international standards and CER accounting although somewhat cumbersome 
also allows for directional failures to be avoided; 
(3) Policy coordination – the policy coordination is well achieved at a national and 
regional level within China as well as at an international level through the 
Designated Operational Entity and the Designated National Authority (Jia et al. 
2012). China’s success is building on providing good support to potential 
investors through access to innovative businesses and to capital as well as with 
having the required national infrastructure and supportive networks. The rigidity 
   
 
of the rules of the mechanism however do not allow for adaptive governance and 
in some cases this was manifested with delays, multiple layers of bureaucracy and 
overall complexity of governance; 
(4) Reflexivity – even with some commitment for the post-Kyoto future of CDM, in 
many ways it is an example of a transformative system failure. There is a lot of 
uncertainty as to what the new CDM will look like. For example, it is not clear 
how CDM links and interacts with other national emission trading schemes. 
Despite some presence and transparency of information about implemented 
projects, this is quite segmented and does not allow for proper information flow 
and innovation exchanges. Schmid (2012) also points out that the detail of the 
transferred technology through the CDM should be clearer, such as where the 
parts of the technology are produced; whether it is patented and how the 
assessment of technology transfer is conducted. 
Overall, CDM is a good example of a global green innovation mechanism but there is need 
for further improvements in its efficiency and governance. CDM projects in a country can act 
as a significant stimulus to low-carbon development (Huang and Barker 2012). China is 
willing to contribute to the global green system of innovation through timely formulating 
relevant policies on climate change and successfully hosting CDM projects activities.  
Conclusion 
As one of the most R&D intensive developing countries, China has been catching up with 
developed countries for decades in economic development. Consequently it has become an 
important global player with many of its products incorporating green energy innovations 
(Wu 2011). According to Pan et al. (2011), the Chinese green technology industries are 
globally competitive because of preferential government policies and further investment in 
R&D will strengthen their position. The country’s economy is also transforming balancing 
intellectual and capital growth with environmental considerations. China is committed to 
building energy efficient and environmentally friendly society which can be achieved through 
upgrading its industrial structure, inspiring and protecting innovation and transformation 
towards a global green system of innovation (Ye and Jian 2011).  
The policy analysis through the lenses of innovation systems shows that there is need for 
national innovation systems to be attuned towards sustainable technologies within a 
framework of a global green system of innovation. The success of this transformation for 
China will depend not only on government actions but also on society adopting “the concept 
and practice of green living” (Pan et al. 2011: 27). 
China is committed to cooperate with the international community through R&D investment 
and innovation for tackling the challenges of climate change and avoid transformational 
system failures. It is well positioned for playing a major role in the global green system of 
innovation. The innovation system concept is ultimately about people – “the knowledge, 
technology, infrastructure and cultures they have created or adopted, who they work with, 
and what new ideas they are experimenting with” (DIISR 2011: iii). People’s voices are most 
loudly heard when they are directly affected by pollution, droughts, floods or other climate 
related calamities, but they also have an active role to play in gearing the world towards a 
green economy. A global green system of innovation will not put a stop to competitiveness 
and/or collaboration. It is however a realignment of priorities and making a change on a new 
path of innovation activities. Most importantly, for the global green innovation system to 
become a reality, every nation and every researcher has to clearly articulate the need for 
   
 
transformation, direct its activities in coordination with other players and be able to reflect on 
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